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This paper presents an endogenous determination of tóe equilibrium trading
rule in a market where buyers areimperfectly informed about the quality ofgoods.
Posted pricing may induce the sellers to select a suboptimal quality level. In
contrast, negotiated pricing always leads to an eflicient selection of quality. The
lack of price competition, however, may allow the seller to exploit óis customer.
We show tóat this trade-off uniquely determines the pricing mechanism that the
market participants will adopt. We specify tbe parameter constellations under
which eitóer posted pricing or negotíated pricing is an equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Modern market economies have generated a variety of institutions for determining prices
and conducting trade. In many markets prices are simply posted by sellers and the buyer
has little direct influence on how much he has to pay. This pricing institution has become
dominant in the retail business after mass retailers replaced Lhe small owner-operated
general store in the second half of the nineteenth century. In other markets prices are
the outcome of bilateral negotiations so that both the aeller and the buyer take an active
part in setting the price. Examples include not only the bazaar of a less developed nation
but also the market for used cars, real estate, antiques, and inputs for manufacturing
firms. This paper provides a theoretical explanation of which pricing institution is likely
to emerge in a market where buyers are imperfectly informed about the quality of goods
or services. We compare the performance characteristics of posted-offer pricing with
negotiated pricing and find that each arrangement has specific merits. These determine
the equilibrium pricing policy as the outcome of competitive interactions between the
market participants. Its nature depends on parameter constellations that reflect the
seriousness of informational market imperfections and the distribution of bargaining
power between buyers and sellers.
The analysis of markets in which each seller posts a selling price at the beginning of
the trading period gces back to Joseph Bertrand (1883). He argued that posted pricing is
highly competitive by observing that in the case of constant marginal costs the compet-
itive outcome emerges even with only two price setting firma. This ao-called `Bertrand
- Paradox' also demonstrates that negotiated pricing cannot be more competitive than
posted pricing unless there are some market imperfections. Indeed, there has been some
debate on the potential harms of posted pricing in markets with qualitative uncertainty.
Suppose the buyer has to visit a firm to determine its choice of product quality and that
he experiences switching costs when moving from one seller to another. Then these costs
create a lock-in effect and a seller who has a locked-in customer may have an incentive
to reduce his cost by choosing a lower quality at the posted price than would be effi-
cient. This argument is often used to advocate self-enforced bans on price advertising2
for providers of professional services such as doctors and lawyers'. When quality is not
costlessly obaervable, the deterioration in product quality associated with poated pricing
may provide a role for other trading mechanisms.
Our analysis shows that negotiated pricing induces the seller to choose the efficient
quality level. The intuition is that, in contrast with posted pricing, bargaining determines
the price of the good after the buyer has arrived at a store and learned its quality. As
long as the bargaining outcomeguarantees the seller a profit that increases with the total
surplus to be divided, he will seek to maximize this surplus by selecting the socially
efficient quality. As a result, the negotiated price market does not exhibit the moral
hazard problem that characterizes the posted price market. However, the lock-in effect
does not leave price bargaining unaffected. Because of the switching cost the buyer finds
himself in a situation of partial bilateral monopoly with the seller. This allowa the seller
to exploit his customer and the bargaining may result in a relatively high price.
The different impact of switching costs on price and quality in the posted and the
negotiated price market determines the competitiveness of these trading rules. When
the buyers prefer shopping at storea with posted prices then negotiated pricing cannot
survive competition among the sellers. We show that this always happens if switching
costs are not too high. Conversely, if the moral Lazard cost of posted priciug exceeds
the benefit from price competition, then bargaining turns out to be more attractive for
the consumer. This is the case when switching costs are high enough and the buyer's
bargaining power is not too low.
The possibility that negotiated pricing is more efficient than posted pricing has been
noted in a laboratory experiment by James Hong and Charles Plott (1982). Their
experiment was designed to examine the claim that posted pricing would improve the
operations of the transportation industry on inland waterways. In the existing market
rates were typically set by individual negotiations between the barge operator and his
customer. Interestingly, Hong and Plott (p. 16) concluded from their data that "price
posting markets do not necessarily operate better than negotiated price markets under
the parametric conditions we considered.r In fact, the posted price polícy resulted in
1Yulc-Shee Chan and Hayne Leland (1982) and William R.ogeraon (1988) examine this argument.3
higher prices, reduced trading volume and ef6ciency losses. Even though the present
model is not directly related to the specific environment of this experiment, it provides
some theoretical insights that go in the same direction. Both studies give some evidence
that in certain markets price competition between the sellers may not be the most efficient
way of conducting trade.
There is a considerable literature studying the formation of prices in decentralized
markets where pairs of agents bargain over the gains from trade. Most of these articles
analyze search and matching markets and focus on the relation between the bargaining
equilibrium and the perfectly competitive outcome~. The trading rule, howevet, is ex-
ogenously given; the sellers are prohibited from competing with each other by posting
prices. The optimal selling strategy of a monopolistic seller is studied by John Riley and
Richard Zeckhauser (1983) and Drew Fudenberg, David Levine, and Jean Tirole (1987).
Their analysis is concerned with the question of whether a fixed posted price yields a
higher payoff for the seller than a haggling strategy. Our approach difl'ers from this work
in that we look at equilibrium trading rules in a competitive market.
To address the problem we study a simple model that allows us to derive an equi-
librium solution both for negotiated and posted pricing. It is presented in Section II.
Sections III and IV investigate the equilibrium outcome under both trading rules. Based
on this analysis we endogenize the determination of trading rules in Section V where
we show that for each parameter constellation there is a unique equilibrium pricing
mechanism. Concluding remarks are contained in Section VI.
2 The Model
We consider a market with N 1 2 identical firms. Each firm produces a single good at
constant returns to scale. Before the market opens, it decides once-and-for-all on the
~This includea work by Peter Diamond and Eric Maskin (1979), Ariel Rubinstein and Asher Wolinsky
(1985), Douglas Gale (1986), aad myaelf (1988). A diRerent context is conaidered in my (1989) paper,
where I replace the price-setting stage ofthe standard spatial competition model by a bargaining game.
Further referencea and a detailed discusaion ofbargainingin amarket setting are found in the monograph
by Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein (1990).4
quality q E {qh, q~} of its output, where qh ~ q~. The cost of producing one unit of quality
q is c(q) with c(q~,) ~ c(q~). In the model consumers do not interact strategically with each
other. This allows us to consider each buyer in isolation independently of whether there
is just single consumer or a set of many identical consumers. The consumer purchases
at most one unit of the good. His utility from purchasing quality q at the price p is
given by q- p. Alternatively, he may not purchase the good from any of the N firms and
consume some `outside good' instead. The price and the quality of the outside good are
exogenously fixed so that the consumer enjoys the net benefit v from buying it.
The buyer does not directly observe the firms' choice of quality. He learns the quality
q sold at a particular store only by visiting the store. There is a cost to visiting a store.
Switching from one of the N sellers to another or to consuming the outside good takes
one time unit. As the buyer discounts future benefits by the discount factor 0 G ó G 1,
this creates a switching cost. We will view ó as a measure of these costs and investigate
its impact on the formation of prices in this market. This is done under the following
assumption:
9n - c(qn) ) v~ qi - c(4~) ~ 0 . (I)
Thus, in the full-information equilibrium with perfect competition all firms would pro-
duce quality qh and the consumer would buy the high-quality good at the price p- c(qh).
Consuming the outside good would yield a lower utility level. In addition, the surplus
from producing the low-quality good is taken to be too low to compete with the outside
good. This implies tliat under imperfect information the buyer will never visit a store
that he auspects to offer quality q~. Accordingly, we can confine our analysis to situations
where the sellers find choosing quality qh optimal.
The full-information equilibrium may no longer be feasible when the consumer can
determine quality only by going to a store. The cost of switching sellers may give rise
to a lock-in effect: Once a consumer ends up in a low quality store, he may be left with
no better choice than to purchase low quality. For low values of ó visiting another seller
may simply be too costly. As a consequence, the sellers may be induced to select quality
qi rather than qh. Indeed, at the given price p- c(qh) producing low quality yíelds higher
profits as c(q~) G c(q~), and so the full-information equilibrium unravels if Á is sufficiently5
low.
To study the selection of qualities in the presence of switching costs, we maintain the
additional assumption
qh - qr G v . (2)
This condition implies that the consumer prefers buying the outside good to purchasing
quality q~, at a price p~ q~. It makes the model interesting by limiting the use of prices
as signals of quality in the posted price market. Even though the buyer may reasonably
be convínced that prices above q~ indicate high quality, because he would always quit a
low-quality store with p ~ q~, he cannot be attracted by such a price offer.
3 The Negotiated Price Market
In the negotiated price market the consumer has the option of purchasing the outside
good or visiting one of the N stores to bargain about the price of the good. Upon
entering a store, he observes the quality q actually chosen by the seller and so the
price negotiations proceed under symmetric information. The `disagreement point' in
this bilateral bargaining situation represents the payoffs of the buyer and the seller,
respectively, if no sale takes place and the buyer quits; it will be denoted as (d, 0). Of
course, the buyer's payoff d depends upon his switching cost and the net benefit that
he expects from bargaining with another seller or simply from consuming the outside
good. Accordingly, in equilibrium d will be determined endogenously; the seller's profit
from not making a sale is zero. Suppose the Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution is
the outcome of the bargaining3. Then the price upon which the parties agree is4
`P(q,d)-ar8mpx ~q-P-~a~P-c(q)~'-b, (3)
with 0 C a G 1. This solution splits the surplus so that the buyer receives the fraction
~. The parameter a may therefore be interpreted as expressing the buyer's `bargaining
9The generalized Nash eolution is studied by John }larsanyi and iteinhard Selten (1972). An axiom-
atization of thia sotution is given by Ehud Kalai (1977) and Alvin Iiuth (1979).
"Of course, an agreement will be reached only if the aurplus q- c(q) - d is non-negative. Thia
condition is alwaya fulfilled in the equilibrium defined below.6
power'; by varying a from zero to unity we can obtain any price that is individually ratio-
nal both for the buyer and the seller. Much of our analysis will focus on the joint impact
of the bargaining parameter a and the friction parameter ê on the market outcome.
As Thomas Schelling (1960, p. 22) points out, `bargaining power' does not necessarily
reflect intelligence or skillfulness; instead bargaining situations may involve "the para-
dox that the power to constrain an adversary may depend on the power to bind oneself;
that, in bargaining, weakness is often strength." Recent developments in non-cooperative
bargaining theory incorporate such commitment possibilities in the description of the
bargaining procedure. The power weights ~ and 1- a may then reflect possible asym-
metries in the speed of communication or in the parties' beliefs concerning the likelihood
of a breakdown of negotiations. [ndeed, Kenneth Binmore, Ariel Rubinstein, and Asher
Wolinsky (1986) take this approach to demonstrate that the Generalized Nash Bargain-
ing Solution can be obtained as the equilibrium oí an extensive game in which the partics
alternate in making offers and counteroffers.
In the event oí breakdown in the negotiations, the buyer can either switch to another
bargaining partner or he can purchase the outside good. As the surplus q~ - c(qi) is less
than v, the buyer will not go to one of the N stores unless he is convinced that he will
find quality qhs. In the equilibrium of the negotiated price market the buyer expects high
quality and he anticipates that the bargaining will result in sorne price p. Given Lhose
expectations and the delay cost of awitching, his expected utility from disagreement is
d(p) - max[óv, á(qn - p)] . (4)
In equilibrium the consumer's price-quality expectations have to be consistent with the
market outcome.
5Ae will be ahown below, choosing qr, is a dominant etrategy for each seller. This precludea the





Definition: p is a Negotiated Price Equiliórium ií
(i) qti - p? v and p ? c(qh); and
(ii) p- cp(qh, d) and d- d(p); and
(iii) p - c(9ti) ? ~(9i, d) - c(9r)-
'fhe first of these conditions ensures that both thc sellers and the buyers are willing to
patticipate in the market. If (i) fails to hold, thcn none of the N scllers is active and thc
consumer purchases the outside good. By (ii), the equilibrium price p is determined by
the bargaining solution, taking into account that the buyer's threat point in the price
negotiation is d(p). Finally, (iii) guarantees that each single seller finds it in his own
interest to select quality qh. In equilibrium the buyer is indifferent between all stores so
that the sellers share the market equally. To state the main result of this Section, we
define the function
óa(a) - v -
o(qn - c(qn)) (5)
(1 - a)v
By assumption (1), bA(.) is decreasing, óA(0) - 1, and óA(of) ? 0 for all a G
v~(qr, - c(qh)). In Figure 1 the function ó- óA(a) represents the borderline between
the two regions I f III and II ~- IV.
- insert Figure 1 here -
Proposition 1: There is a Negotiated Price Equiliórium if and only if ó 1 óA(a). IJ
ó 1 óA(a), the Negotiated Price Equiliórium is unique mith
P-(1
- a)(1 - ó)qn f ac(9h)
1-(1-~)b
Proof: The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution is defined by the necessary and suf-
ficient first-order condition
~P(q,d) - (I - a)(q - d) f oc(q) - (6)s
Accordingly, ~p(q, d) - c(q) -(1 - a)[q - c(q) - d] so that by assumption (1) equilibrium
condition (iii) is satisfied for any p satisfying condition (ii). By the first inequality oí
condition (i), one must have d(p) - ê(q~, - p). Therefore, solving (ii) for p yields the
unique solution stated in the proposition. This solution always satisfies the second in-
equality in (i); the first inequality in (i) is identical to a[qh - Cti]~[1 -(1 - cr)ó] ? v. By
definition of óA this is equivalent to ó? óA(o). Q.E.D.
The inequality á 7 6A(a) is satisfied in regions II and IV of Figure 1. For these
parameter constellations the consumer purchases the high-quality good at the price p.
As p exceeds e(qti), the presence of market frictions enables the sellers to earn positive
profits. These are the higher, the lower ë and a. Interestingly, p approaches c(q~) both
in the limit when 6-a 1 and in the limit when a~ I. The first of these properties
justifies viewing the perfectly competitive outcome as the limiting point of a market
with negligible switching costs.
Why does the consumer purchase the outside good for values of ó and a in regions
I and I11, where a negotiated price equilibrium fails to exist? The reason is that these
parameter values violate equilibrium condition (i). With high switching costs and little
bargaining power the buyer cannot get a favourable deal once he has entered a store.
Knowing this ex ante keeps him from going to a store and induces him to consume the
outside good.
Importantly, the proof of Proposition 1 reveals that the negotiated price market in-
volves no problem of moral hazard; i.e. the incentive constraint (iii) is never binding.
This perhapa surprising observation has a simple intuition: As a characteristic of the ne-
gotiated price market, the price at which the good is sold is determined aJterthe buyer
has learned its quality. The bargaining outcome guarantees the seller a fraction (1 - a)
of the bargaining surplus. As a result, he is always better off by producing q~ because
this quality yields a higher surplus than q~. Choosing quality qh is a dominant strategy
for the seller in the negotiated price market. This fact distinguishes this market írom the
posted price market, which we turn to in the next Section, where prices are set bejorelo
the consumer becomes aware of qualitiese.
4 The Posted Price Market
In the posted price market the sellers act as Bertrand competitors by posting pricea.
The buyer observes these price quotations and compares their attractiveness with the
outside option utility v. After entering a store and learning its quality he can either make
a purchase at the posted price or switch to another seller. By assumption (1), he will not
go to a store if he anticipates to find quality q~~. In the posted price equilibrium the buyer
expects qh in each store and so all sellers post the same price p'. As all stores appear
identical to the buyer, he visits one of them at random. To confirm his expectations,
competition must induce tlie suppliers to offer quality qhs. As q is not directly observable,
each siugle seller has an inceutive Lo select yh at the posted price ~í ouly if Lhe buyer
would quit after observing quality q~. Given his expectations about qualities at other
stores, the buyer will certainly do so if q~ - p' c d(p'). In fact, we will assume that the
buyer refuses to purchase low quality unless he is not actually worse off by departing9.
This means that each single seller will choose quality qti if and only if the equilibrium
price p' satisfies the restriction p' 1 a(p'), where
~(P) - 9i - d(P~) . (7)
While p' ~~r(p') ensures the provision of high quality, a key factor in the determi-
nation of p' is that prices are a signal of quality. Should some seller deviate from p' by
posting p G p`, then the buyers will use the observed price to draw inferences about this
seller's quality. If they interpret p as a signal of quality q~, they will not be attracted
even though p G p'. The opposite happens if p is regarded as a signal of quality qh.
BThe relationship between ex ante and ex post pricing in a model without qualitative uncertainty is
explored by Douglas Gale (1988).
~Of course, the buyer presumea that no seller offers the good at a price below coat.
dWe assume that each aeller eelects q~ when he is indiflérent between q~ and q~.
9Thie tie-breaking rule is neceasary to avoid the open set problem that would occur if there were no
loweat price that signals high quality. Indeed, equilibrium condition (iii) below is impoesible to satiafy
ifcondition (ii) is replaced by p' ~ x(p').11
As in other signalling games, such an indeterminacy of out-of-equilibrium beliefs may
lead to a multiplicity of equilibrium prices p'. To avoid this problem, we will restrict
the buyers' beliefs to satisfy the `intuitive criterion' proposed by In-Koo Cho and David
Kreps (1987). Suppose some seller wants to undercut his competitors by some price p
slightly below p' and, at the same time, wishes to convince the consumer that he offers
high quality. Then we may reasonably assume that this seller succeeds if he would not
gain by posting p and selecting quality q~, even when his offer attracted the entire mar-
ket. This prerequisite is fulfilled if low quality deters the customer from paying p for
the good, i.e. if p? ~r(p'). Summing up, in the posted price equilibrium p' only prices
p~ x(p') are considered as a signal of high quality.
Definition: p' is Posted PrYCe Equilibrium if
(~) qn - p' 1 v and P~ ~ c(9h); and
(ii) p' 1 ~r(P'); and
(iii) there is no p 1 rr(p') such that p G p' and p- c(qh) 1[p' - c(qh)]~N.
The first of these conditions is the same as in the definition oï the negotiated price
equilibrium. Requirement (ii) represents the sellers' incentive-compatibiGty constraint
to provide high quality. Condition (iii) precludes that any of the sellers can gain by
unilaterally posting some price p below p' that signals high quality. Here we assume
that if all sellers post the same price p', each store has the same chance of attracting
consumers so that its market share equals 1~N. The equilibrium outcome depends on




then 0 G bB G 1 because of assumption (2) and qh ~ q~.
(8)
Proposition 2: There is a Posted Price Equilíbrium if and only if b~ bB. !f b 1 bB,
the Posted Price Equilibrium is unique with
P - max~c(qn), (q~ - áqn)I(1 - b)].12
Proof: By the first inequality in equilibrium condition (i) one has a(p') - q~-ë(qh-p')
As p' ~ c(qti) and N~ 2, condition (iii) is satisfied if and only if p' minimizes p subject
to p 1 c(qti) and p 1 a(p'.) For À 1 [q~ - c(qti)]~[qh - c(q~)] only the first constraint is
binding and so one has p' - c(qh). Otherwise only the second constraint is binding ao
that p' - u(p'), i.e. p' -(qi - óqti)~(1 - ó). If p` - c(q~), the first inequality in (i) is
always satisfied. For p' 1 c(qh) this inequality becomes qy - p' -(q~, - q~)~(1 - ó) ~ v
which, by definition of bB, is identical to ó~ óB. Q.E.D.
Regions I and 11 of Figure 1 describe the area where a posted price equilibrium ex-
ists. For ó close enough to unity, the posted price p' equals c(qti). For lower values of ó,
however, we observe that price exceeds marginal costs. More specifically, this happens
when óB G ó G(q~ - c(q~)]~[qh - c(qh)] because the incentive restriction (ii) is biuding.
For this intermediate level of switching costs only prices above c(qti) are considered as
a credible signal of high quality. This signalling effect also explains why positive profits
may be consistent with Bertrand competition in markets with imperfect information.
Undercutting is not profitable because prices below p' eliminate the seller's inceritive to
supply high quality and, therefore, do not attract the consumer. For values of ó below
óB the lock-in effect becomes too strong and leads to a deterioration of product quality.
As a consequence, the institution of posted offer pricing precludes the sellers from being
active in the market and results in consumption of the outside good in regions III and
IV.
Because moral hazard is present only in the posted price market but not in the
negotiated price market, the latter pricing institution may be more efficient. This is
clearly the case when the parameter values of ë and a lie in region IV of Figuro 1.
Here the N firms remain inactive in the posted price market, whereas negotiated pricing
results in production of the high-quality good with positive payoffs both for the sellers
and the buyers. In contrast, the posted price market appears superior in region I. In this
region the buyer reírains from entering negotiations because his bargaining power is too
low. Price posting enables the sellers to overcome this problem by committing them to
sell the good at a suf6ciently low price. In region II both pricing rules allow the sellets13
to participate actively in the market.
The key insight from Propositions 1 and 2 is that the two categories of trading in-
stitutiona involve a trade-off: Price bargaining avoids the moral hazard problem in the
firms' selection of qualities. Yet, as the price is determined ex post after the buyer has
chosen the aeller, it may not guarantee the buyer a sufficient fraction of the surplus to
make bargaining attractive ex ante. Ex ante pricing, as in the posted price market,
does not suffer from this drawback. But, when the price is fixed ex ante, the lock-in
effect may liave a negative impact on the seller's incentive to produce high quality. '1'he
relative importance of these considerations depends on the parameters b and a. The fol-
lowing Section will demonstrate that the trade-off between the two pricing institutions
can explain which will emerge as an equilibrium trading rule in a given environment.
5 The Stability of Competition
This Section is devoted to analysing which pricing mechanism is stable against compe-
tition. A particular trading rule can survive only if no trader can gain by deviating and
using another trading rule. Applying this idea to the negotiated price market means
that no seller should be able to profit from posting a price ex ante in a situation where
al! the other sellers rely on ex post pricing. That is, it must be impossible to profitably
attract the demand of all consumers by undercutting the negotiated price equilibrium p
and posting p C p. The reason why such an attempt may fail is that prices below p may
be viewed as an indication of low quality. Using the same restrictions on belie[s as in
Section 4, we will assume that the posted offer p convinces the consumer of quality qy,
only if p 1 a(p), where ~r(.) is defined by (7).
Definition: The Negotiated Price Equilibrium p is stable against price competition
if there is no p G p such that
(i) P ? ~(P); and






In other words, the institution of negotiated pricing cannot be eroded by price posting
if any offer below p is either viewed as a low-quality signal or fails to increase the seller's
profit even when he serves the whole market. To determine the range of parameter values
where this is true, we define the function
óC(a) -
a(qh - C(qh)) - (qh - 9r)
a(9h - c(qn)) - (1 - a)(9h - qr)
(9)
Note that for a' -(qh - 9r]~[qh - 9r f 9h - c(qh) - v] one has
ón(a~) - óe - óc(a') . (10)
Moreover, ó~(a) ~ 0 for all a E (a',1). In Figure 2 the function ó- 6c(a) is depicted
for a E(a',1); it divides the former region II of Figure 1 into the regions II' and II.
- insert Figure 2 here -
Proposition 3: The Negotiated Price Equilibrium p is stable against price competition
ij and only iJa ~ a' and ó C óc(a).
Proof: As p~ c(qh) and N ~ 2, there is always a p G p satisfying (ii) in the def-
inition of stability. As qh - p 1 v, condition (i) is identical to p~ qr - ê(qh.- p).
Therefore, p is stable if and only if there is no p G p satisfying (i). This means one must
have p C qr - 6(qh - p). Using p from Proposition 1, this condition is equivalent to
á(a(qh - C~qh)) - (1 - a)(qh - qO] C a(qh - C(qh)) - ( ~íh - q!) ~
As ó G 1, this inequality cannot hold if the I.h.s. is negative. Accordingly, by defini-
tion of óc(a), (11) holds if and only if a 1 [qn - 9r]~[qh - c(qh) -(9h - 9r)] -~ and
b C óc(a). Note that óc(a) is strictly increasing for a ~ á and that bA(a') - óc(a').
Accordingly, by Proposition 1 there is no Negotiated Price Equilibrium p for a E(~, a')
and ó G óc(a). This means, condition (11) applies if and only if a~ a' and ó G bc(a).
Q.E.D.Is
Propoaition 3 atates that negotiated pricing cannot be suatained as a Nash equilibrium
in the firms' choice of pricing policies for parameter constellations in tegions I and II'
of Figure 2. Negotiated pricing constitutes an equilibrium only in regiona II and IV.
Intereatingty, we notice that such an equilibrium necessítates a certain amounL of market
frictions. As b~(1) G 1, bargaining is not a stable pricing institution when Á is close to
unity. Negotiated pricing is unlikely to survive in a highly competitive, almost friction-
less environment. At first sighL it may ap~xar paradoxical that for h G bc( I) tl~c scllers
will rely on price bargaining when the buyer's bargaining powcr is rathcr high. But, this
is so because competition forces thern to adopt a trading rule that is advautageous Cor
the buyer.
To complete our analysis, we now investigate the stability of posted pricing. We as-
sume that posting p' legally cornmits the seller only in the sense that he cannot ask
his customers to pay more than p'. However, this dces not constrain the parties not to
jointly revise the terms of the transaction. If in the course of bargaining they both reach
an agreement, then this replaces the posted price. Accordingly, the buyer accepts the
seller's posted offer p' only if he dces not see a chance to pay less after bargaining.
Definition: The Posted Price Equilibrium p' is stable against bargaining if, given
d- d(p')~ ~G(qn, d) ~ p'.
Given that the buyer cannot induce a price reduction by bargaining, he has to pay
p` after switching to another store. Therefore, his threat point in a stable posted price
equilibrium is d(p'), as defined by (4).
Proposition 4: The Posted Price Equilibrium p' is stable against bargaining ij and
only ij either a G~' or o~ a' and 6 ~ bc(a).
Proof: Using (6), p" is stable if and only if p' G(1 - a)[qh - d(p')] .} oc(qh). As17
d(p') - b(qh - p'),this is equivalent to
P ~ [(1 - a)( I - b)qh -~ ac(qh)JI[1 - (1 - a)b] . (12)
By Proposition 2 this condition always holds ií b 1[q~ - c(qh)]~[qh - c(qh)] because then
P~ - c(9h). For 6 E ([qt - c(qh)]~[qh - ~(qh)] , be), P' -(4~ - óqh)~(1 - 6) so that (12) is
identical to
b[a(qh - c(qh)) - (1 - ~)(Qh - qOJ ! ~(Qh - C(Qh)) - (qh -9t) . (ls)
As 0 G b G 1, (13) always holds if the l.h.s. is negative, i.e. if a G [qh - 4~U[9h - c(qh) -
(qh - qt)] - á. For o 1~, (13) is equivalent to b~ b~(a). By Proposition 2, p' exists
if and only ií b~ 6B. As 6B ~ b~(a) for a E(á,~'), any p' is stable if a G cr'. For
a E[a',1), one has bB C 6~(~) G [q~ - c(qh)]~[qh - c(Qh)] so that over this range (12)
holds if and only if b 1 b~(a). Q.E.D.
Propositions 3 and 4 dcmonstrate LLat whenever the N scllers arc active in the mar-
ket, a unique stable pricing institution emerges. As the stability criterion eliminates
posted pricing in region 11 of Figure 2, our model predicts Bertrand competition to pre-
vail in regions I and 17' and negotiated pricing in regions II and IV. Using Propositions
1 and 2, it is easily established that p' G p in region 17' whereas p G p' in region II. The
endogenous determination of trading rules thus maximizes the consumer's equilibrium
utility. In region II' the sellers are trapped in a Prisoner's Dilemma type aituation.
They all end up with lower profits because the negotiated price p makes undercutting
profitable. In contrast, in region II the signalling effect associated with posted pricing
results in a price level p` that makes bargaining more efficient to cope with the moral
hazard problem.
6 Conclusion
We have explored how different pricing mechanisms affect the determination of qual-
ity and price in a market with quality uncertainty and switching costs. Posted pricing
allows the sellers to commit themselves to a price before the consumer enters a store.18
This commitment together with competitive behavior restricts their ability to exploit
the customer in terms of prices. However, it creates an incentive to use the quality di-
mension for this purpose. This means price competition runs the risk of reducing quality
competition. This dces not happen in the negotiated price market where prices are de-
termined by bargaining after the conaumer has observed quality. Yet, the disadvantage
of this trading procedure is that the consumer may ex post end up paying a high price.
In short, posted pricing involves moral hazard whereas negotiated pricing is not very
competitive.
We have shown that in our model this trade-off between the two trading institutions
uniquely determines the equilibrium pricing policy. As long as the departure from the
perfectly competitive model of a frictionless market is not too large, Bertrand pricing
leaves no room for price bargaining. Negotiated pricing necessitates some level of frictions
and occurs when the buyer's bargaining power is sufficiently high to prevent exploitation.
Also, the equilibrium trading mechanism has the interesting property that it ensures the
consumer the highest possible utility level.
Our model stresses the role oí quality uncertainty for the determination oí pricing
rules. Of course, this leaves out a number of other considerations that may be important.
For instance, we have assumed that bargaining proceeds under symmetric information so
that negotiations are costless. Asymmetric information bargaining models can generate
costs in the form of delay in agreementlo. In addition, they imply some ex ante uncer-
tainty about the outcome. Such factors may favor posted pricing. In general, however,
iL is not a priori clear which is t.he most efTci~nt prícing institution when informat.ion
and incentive problems are involved.
~aThe aimpleat model of thia type aeeumes one-aided uncertainty about the buyer'e valuation of the
good and conaiders an extensive game in which the aeller makea a sequence ofoffera to the buyer as, e.g.,
in 7ce1 Sobel and Ichiro Takahashi (1983). For the role of delay in bargaining, eee also Anat Admati
and Motty Perry (1987) and Faruk Gul and Hugo Sonnenschein (1988).19
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